



by Brian A. Cromwell Brian A. Cromwell is an
economist at the Federal Reserve
Bank of Cleveland. The author
wishes to thank Randall Eberts,
Joseph Haubrich, Louis Jacob-
son, Elizabeth Laderman,
Katherine Samolyk, and Gary
Whalen for helpful comments and
suggestions.
Introduction
The relationship between the performance of
the financial sector and economic activity has
received increasing attention from economists in
the past decade. The "credit view" holds that var-
iation in the supply of financial services not cap-
tured in monetary aggregates can help to
explain real economic activity. Empirical studies
of the importance of the banking sector have
been conducted at both the macro and the
regional level and in general support the view
that financial structure and stress can have real
effects.
Interest in this view coincides with the dra-
matic restructuring of the financial sector that
has accompanied both the advent of deregula-
tion and interstate banking and the significant
increase in bank failures in the 1980s. By the
end of 1988, all but three states permitted some
form of interstate acquisition of their banks,
14,600 offices of banking organizations existed
outside of the organizations' home state, and
more than half of these were permitted to offer
all banking services.
1 Bank failures, which
averaged 75 per year in the 1970s, rose from
less than 50 per year in the early 1980s to more
than 200 per year by 1987. Financial-sector
restructuring in the form of bank mergers,
takeovers, or failures can affect investment and
consumption decisions by disrupting the links
between borrowers and creditors.
This paper explores the impact of financial
restructuring on economic activity using an alter-
native data set that in some respects more com-
pletely measures change in the local banking
sector than do data used in previous research.
Restructuring in the local banking sector is
measured by the birth, expansion, contraction,
and death of banks within a standard metropol-
itan statistical area (SMSA), as estimated by the
Small Business Administration using Dun and
Bradstreet files.
These data, known as the U.S. Establishment
and Longitudinal Microdata (USELM), attempt to
• 1 These figures come from a recent comprehensive review of inter-
state banking by King, Tschinkel, and Whitehead (1989). Earlier surveys




Best available copyrecord the location and employment levels of
all establishments in all industries. For multi-
establishment firms, ultimate ownership of each
establishment is tracked. With respect to bank-
ing, an establishment equals a bank, a bank sub-
sidiary, or branch office.
2 (Although the USELM
establishment framework does not account for
the variations in bank organizations across states,
its advantage is that it is applied consistently.)
The USELM data are aptly suited for examin-
ing the disruption of credit relationships, since
Dun and Bradstreet collects these data for the
purpose of recording the creditworthiness of
firms. A "death" is recorded if a firm fails or is
taken over by management sufficiently different
from existing management to warrant a reexam-
ination of the firm's credit. To the extent that
takeovers, management changes, and branch
closings affect local credit relations, the employ-
ment effects from bank deaths can potentially
measure the disruption of credit links between
borrowers and lenders.
The empirical analysis presented here uses
employment changes resulting from the birth,
death, expansion, and contraction of small, mid-
sized, and large banks as a proxy for restructur-
ing in the banking industry. These measures are
linked to the local economic performance of
217 SMSAs in the periods 1980-82 and 1984-86.
If the credit view is supported, the impact of
employment changes from a bank death should
be negative and significantly greater in mag-
nitude than the impact of a bank contraction,
since a bank closing should be more disruptive
to credit relations than simply a reduction in the
bank's staff.
The results suggest that the deaths of mid-
sized banks—those employing between 100 and
500 employees—have a negative but short-lived
impact on economic activity. Exploration of the
channels for this impact indicates that bank
deaths affect employment in other midsized
firms that presumably rely principally on local
banking markets and that are the most likely
customers of midsized banks. The results control
for overall financial restructuring and lagged





Restructuring due to financial stress—reflected
in bank failures, closings, and mergers—is poten-
tially detrimental to local economic growth.
3 In
the case of a bank failure, several types of eco-
nomic agents may be affected. Bank share-
holders and uninsured depositors, for example,
may suffer declines in wealth. For a local econ-
omy, however, any wealth effect is likely to be
small. If the failed bank is merged with another
bank, as is commonly the case, uninsured
depositors may suffer no losses. Moreover, even
if a failed bank is closed, these depositors gen-
erally recover (over time) a high percentage of
their funds when the bank's assets are liquidated.
Another effect on local economic activity
takes place through reductions in bank employ-
ment when banks fail or are taken over. In addi-
tion to this direct consequence for local employ-
ment, unemployed bank workers suffering a
loss of personal income will also likely reduce
their consumption expenditures, sending a fur-
ther negative ripple (or multiplier) effect
through the economy. The following section
presents direct measures erf the employment
losses caused by bank deaths and looks for
employment effects in nonbank sectors. More
important, it examines a direct measure of
employment losses in banking due to bank con-
tractions to see if the spillovers from bank
employment losses are different for failures
than for contractions.
Credit Disruptions
In addition to these two potential effects, bank
closings can disrupt credit relationships. The
credit-view literature holds that the principal
channel of a bank failure's economic impact is
the disruption of borrower-lender relationships.
Each lender is assumed to have more informa-
tion on its existing borrowers than do other
potential lenders.
4 When bank failure results in
closure rather than reorganization, borrowers
are forced to seek credit from new sources. Dur-
ing the period in which a new long-term credit
• 2 In practice. Dun and Bradstreet tracks all banking establishments
listed in telephone directories, including branch offices.
• 3 This section in partfollows Gilbertand Kochin's (1990) presen-
tation.
• 4 Gertler (1988) surveys the literature on credit and aggregate
economic activity. Articles on the theory of financial intermediation
include Diamond (1984) and Campbell and Kracaw (1980).
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
1990 Q 3
Best available copyrelationship is established, borrowers are likely
to face higher costs of credit or credit rationing.
Even if the failed bank is merged into a sur-
viving bank, borrowers may encounter new
loan policies and new senior management if
they apply for extensions of their credit. Again,
the terms of credit are likely to be less favorable
than those offered by the previous management.
The USELM data count bank takeovers and
mergers as bank deaths only if there is a
change in operating management sufficient for
Dun and Bradstreet to reexamine the new
organization's credit rating. To the extent that
takeovers, management changes, and branch
closings affect local credit relations, USELM's
measures of change in bank employment due
to bank deaths can be used to estimate the dis-
ruption of credit links between borrowers and
lenders. Because we can also measure employ-
ment changes due to bank contractions, we
use the difference between the impact of bank
contractions and bank deaths to distinguish
between the direct employment effects of a
bank death and the impact of credit disruptions.^
Empirical Evidence
Empirical studies of the importance of the bank-
ing sector at both the macro and the regional
level generally support the view that financial
structure and stress can affect economic activity.
In a study of the macro effects of financial
stress, Bernanke (1983) argues that extensive
bank runs and defaults in the 1930-33 financial
crisis reduced the efficiency of the financial sec-
tor in performing its intermediation function,
and that this had adverse effects on real output
through either than monetary channels . He
examines the effect of the real value of the
change in deposits of failed banks on the
growth rate of industrial production. Using
regression analysis with monthly data for the
years 1919 through 1941, Bernanke finds that
bank failures have a negative and statistically
significant effect on industrial output. Samolyk
(1988) conducts a similar test on British data,
using corporate and noncorporate insolvencies
as proxies for the health of the financial sector,
and also finds that credit factors matter empiri-
cally in explaining output. Using Canadian data,
Haubrich (1990) also determines that the credit
• 5 We maintain the assumption that the local economic effect of a
bank contraction results solely from the multiplier effect of reduced
employment, rather than from credit disruptions.
disruptions resulting from bank failures, as
opposed to expansions or contractions, affect
economic activity.
The credit view would also predict an impact
of stress in local banking markets on local econo-
mies. Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock (1986)
examine the impact of bank failures on real farm
output. Using annual state data for farm output,
they find that the number of bank failures lagged
one year has a negative and statistically signifi-
cant effect. Gilbert and Kochin (1990) test the
hypothesis that bank failures have adverse
effects on sales subject to sales tax and on
county employment using rural county-level
data. They find that bank closings have a nega-






Financial restructuring at the local level is ana-
lyzed here by the birth, expansion, contraction,
and death of banking establishments at the
SMSA level, as measured in the USELM data for
the periods 1980-82 and 1984-86. The longitu-
dinal establishment data files of the U.S. Estab-
lishment and Enterprise Microdata (USEEM)
were constructed primarily from data in the Dun
and Bradstreet Duns Market Identifier Files
(DMI). The Small Business Administration then
assembled more than 16 million establishment
records contained in the DMI files to construct
the USELM file. A team from the Brookings Insti-
tution merged DMI data longitudinally and asso-
ciated each establishment with its owners. The
longitudinal detail in the data makes it possible
to measure employment change of establish-
ments in a given size class. It also allows employ-
ment change to be decomposed by establish-
ment birth or death, or by the growth (or con-
traction) of continuing establishments, and
allows for the tracking of mergers, acquisitions,
and divestitures.
The data base includes employment figures
and industry classifications for all establishments
and enterprises, sales data for all enterprises and
subsidiaries, age of all nonbranch establish-
ments, and organizational status and geographic
data for each establishment. In principle, every
establishment in the United States is covered,
except for federal agencies.
Dun and Bradstreet's principal business is
provision of credit ratings, which must be
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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management. Among other activities, the firm
tracks court proceedings in bankruptcy cases in
order to record the creditworthiness of estab-
lishments. A death is recorded if the establish-
ment is closed or is taken over by management
that is sufficiently different to warrant reexamin-
ing the firm's credit.'
In the case of banking, a death could repre-
sent the takeover of a bank by another bank
(recorded simultaneously as a death and an
expansion), a major change in ownership and
management (recorded simultaneously as a
death and a birth), or a true failure (recorded
solely as a death). As such, it is an imperfect
measure of liquidations of financial institutions.
To the extent that takeovers and management
changes affect local credit relations, the USELM
measure of bank deaths can proxy for the dis-




In an exploration of the impact of bank struc-
ture on regional development, Bauer and Crom-
well (1989) show that the private banking sec-
tor appears to be systematically related to firm
births. This study, however, is limited by the
inadequacy of data on the location of financial
institutions. Bank data were obtained from the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination
Council's Reports on Condition and Income,
known as call reports, for 1980. For some finan-
cial measures such as total loans, however, it is
not possible to detemiine where the loans were
made, even though their dollar value is known.
For example, loans made by an Ohio bank to
firms in Florida and Ohio are counted in the
same way. An additional measurement problem
is that a call report for a consolidated banking
unit may include data for branches not located
in the SMSA. In states that allow branch bank-
ing, activity at the branches may be reported
solely in the headquarter's SMSA.
• 6 In practice, a death is identified when a firm appearing in the Dun
and Bradstreet file in an initial year does not appear in an end-year file.
The reason could be either that the firm was actually closed or that its
identifying number was changed as a result of new management. Simi-
larly, a birth is identified by the appearance of a firm in the end-year file.
The Small Business Administration uses two-year intervals to track firms.
In principle, the USELM data report the loca-
tion and employment levels of banking estab-
lishments with a greater degree of accuracy
than the call report data, which record bank
statistics at the firm (headquarters) level for
many establishments (subsidiaries or branches).
For example, a bank headquartered in Cincin-
nati could report data for its Columbus and
Dayton branches in its call report, resulting in a
distortion of the measured banking activity in
Cincinnati. For purposes of the USELM data,
however, branches in Columbus and Dayton
are recorded as establishments in those SMSAs.
Out-of-state ownership of establishments is also




The USELM data set. while having advantages
for this analysis, is not problem free. The major
reasons to question the validity of statistics
derived from DMI files stem from three charac-
teristics of the underlying data-collection effort.
First, the employment figures are self-reported
by establishments, usually in telephone inter-
views. Second, employment figures are not
routinely updated; updates are primarily a result
of requests for credit checks. Jacobson (1985)
reports that substantial lags can occur between
the date the file is extracted and the last time the
firm was surveyed. Employment statistics are
often more than two years out of date, which
may lead to infrequent reports for smaller and
slower-growing establishments with less need
for credit checks, and to delays in picking up
shutdowns and status changes for these firms.
Third, there are delays in recognizing the crea-
tion of new establishments. A business may be
in existence three to five years before it is
recorded as a birth in the USELM data.
To deal with some of these shortcomings,
the Small Business Administration has modified
the Dun and Bradstreet data in several ways in
constructing the USELM file. Establishments for
which employment data were missing were
assigned the state-level median employment for
organizations in their standard industrial classi-
fication (SIC) code. Some 8.7 percent of estab-
lishments in finance, insurance, and real estate
(FIRE) received estimated employment figures in






Small, Midsized, and Large Banks
Bank Size
Type 1:
0 to 100 employees
Type 2:
100 to 500 employees
Type 3:






1980 1982 1984 1986
0.247 0.247 0.256 0.229
(0.277) (0.269) (0.260) (0.224)
0.237 0.232 0.188 0.190
(0.282) (0.271) (0.206) (0.196)
0.480 0.486 0.511 0.519
(0.351) (0.344) (0.308) (0.294)
0.035 0.035 0.046 0.062
(0.127) (0.120) (0.119) (0.145)
NOTE: Numbers arc expressed as SMSA means. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Authors calculations based on USELM data.
1980 (Harris [19831). Furthermore, when total
firm-level employment exceeded the aggregate
establishment-level employment data, it was
assumed that the number of branches had been
underreported. Branches were then imputed
from this excess employment according to the
average branch size for the particular industry-
size classification. In 1980, 17 percent of the
establishments in FIRE were imputed. The
imputed branches lack geographic information
beyond the state, however.
Finally, records that were not updated
during the sample period were removed from
the data set. The remaining updated records
were then weighted to reflect the underlying
population. Weights were assigned on the basis
of the level of reporting in firm categories based
on size, organization type, and industry. Report-
ing problems within the banking sector led
analysts at the Brookings Institution to separate
commercial banking from the rest of FIRE,
resulting in a much more accurately weighted
population in both parts of this sector. The level
of reporting problems is higher outside SMSAs
than within them (Armington and Odle [1983]),
which does not present a problem for the analy-
sis where the SMSA is the unit of observation.
In general, geographic errors from nonreport-
ing of branches appear to be more severe for
large firms with several establishments. Errors
resulting from records that are not routinely
updated and from inaccurate geographic distri-
bution of weighting are more severe for small
firms that have infrequent credit checks under
the Dun and Bradstreet system. The employ-
ment statistics and location of independent mid-
sized firms with few establishments or branches
however, appear to be more accurately meas-
ured. The midsized firms undergo more frequent
credit checks than small businesses and are less
likely to be widely distributed geographically.
The following estimation presents plausible and
significant results for the economic impact of
midsized banks on midsized firms, but weaker
results for small and large banks. Whether these
results are due to the true importance of mid-
sized banks or to measurement error is uncertain,




This paper assumes that banking employment
losses due to bank deaths, as measured in the
USELM data, are a reasonable proxy of credit
disaiptions during restructuring in local bank-
ing markets. To control for the direct effects of
the job losses of bank employees and the credit
effects of restructuring, I use the difference
between the impact of bank contractions and
bank deaths on local economic activity to iden-
tify real economic effects resulting from disrup-
tion of credit channels. Data were collected for
217 SMSAs for the periods 1980-82 and 1984-
86. The sample was limited to those SMSAs for
which complete information was available.
Four types of establishments are identified
through an extract of the USELM data base. Type
1 establishments belong to independent firms
with fewer than 100 employees—typically single-
establishment small businesses. Type 2 establish-
ments belong to independent firms with 100 to
500 employee;*—midsized finns that may have
more than one establishment. Type 3 establish-
ments belong to finns with greater than 500
employees headquartered within the same state.
Type 4 establishments belong to firms with greater
than 500 employees headquartered out of state.
The percentage of bank employees in the
four types of firm categories used in this study
(averaged across SMSAs) is given in table 1. The
• 8 The Small Business Administration's time-series construction of




Distribution of Bank Employment

















































SOURCE: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Annual Report, 1980.
L E 3
Bank Employment by Asset
Category over Time
Asset Class Employees per Bank
($ millions) 1980
0to25 13.4
25 to 100 49.0
100 to 1,000 272.2












SOURCES: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Annual Report, 1980.
and Statistics on Banking, 1986.
impact of financial restructuring is suggested by
changes in these employment categories over
time. Employment in small banks declined from
an average 24.7 percent in 1980 to 22.9 percent in
1986; employment in midsized banks declined
from 23.7 percent to 19.0 percent. Employment in
large in-state banks, however, increased from 48.0
percent to 51-9 percent, while employment in out-
of-state banks almost doubled, from 3.5 percent to
6.2 percent, reflecting the growing importance of
interstate banking.
Bank Employment
as a Proxy for
Financial Structure
Before concluding that changes in bank
employment represent changes in financial
structure, one must assess the validity of bank
employment as a proxy for bank size, the
impact of labor productivity in the banking sec-
tor, and changes in the size distribution of banks.
Table 2 reports the distribution of bank
employment in 1980 across banks categorized
by asset size. In general, the standard definition
of a midsized firm as having 100 to 500 employ-
ees matches up well with the standard definition
of a midsized bank as having assets between
$100 million and SI billion. Average employ-
ment per bank ranges from 73 employees for
banks in the $50 million to $100 million category
to 711 employees for banks in the $500 million
to $1 billion category. Similarly, our measures of
small and large firms match up with standard
definitions of small and large banks.
The data suggest large improvements in
labor productivity (measured as employees per
bank, controlling for assets) for all bank size
categories over the 1980-86 period. As shown in
table 3, average employment per bank declined
over the period for banks in all asset categories.
Decreases ranged from 13 and 32 percent for
small banks in the $0 to S25 million and S25 mil-
lion to S100 million categories, respectively, to
45 percent for midsized banks in the $100 mil-
lion to $1 billion category. Productivity gains for
large banks with assets of greater than $ 1 billion
averaged only 25 percent. Again, our definition
of a midsized firm is consistent with the defini-
tion of midsized banks, which averaged 150
employees per bank in 1986.
Table 4 reports shifts in the relative impor-
tance of small, midsized, and large banks over
the 1980-86 period. In general, small banks
declined in both number and relative impor-
tance, midsized banks were little changed, and
large banks increased in importance.
Small banks with less than $25 million in
assets constituted 50.8 percent of all banks in 1980
but held only 5.1 percent of all assets. By 1986,
they had declined to 34 percent of all banks
and their share of assets stood at 2.4 percent.
Declines in the share of assets also occurred in
banks in the S25 million to $50 million and $50
million to $100 million categories. The number
and share of assets of midsized banks were little
changed over the 1980-86 period. As a percentage
of all banks, those in the $100 million to $300 mil-
lion category increased from 7.9 percent to 13-4
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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SOURCES: Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Annual Report, 1980,









0 to 100 employees
Type 2:








1980 1982 1984 1986
0.385 0.385 0.390 0.411
(0.064) (0.066) (0.065) (0.072)
0.133 0.138 0.130 0.136
(0.027) (0.030) (0.026) (0.025)
0.056 0.053 0.053 0.053
(0.017) (0.016) (0.015) (0.014)
0.080 0.077 0.077 0.080
(0.045) (0.044) (0.044) (0.048)
0.119 0.112 0.110 0.114
(0.050) (0.046) (0.046) (0.046)
NOTE: Numbers are expressed as SMSA means. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations based on USELM data.
percent, but their share of assets rose only from
9.8 percent to 10.4 percent. Banks in the $300
million to $500 million category increased their
share of assets slightly, while those in the $500
million to $1 billion range showed a small
decline in asset share. Banks with assets of
greater than $1 billion constituted only 1.3 per-
cent of all banks in 1980 but accounted for 61.1
percent of assets. By 1986, the asset share of
large banks rose to 66.5 percent.
In general, the changes in bank structure sug-
gested by the employment shifts in table 1
reflect transformations observed in the distribu-
tion of banks by asset size. Small banks declined
in importance, while large banks gained. The
drop of employment in the midsized banks,
however, is most likely the result of strong labor
productivity gains, which exceeded those of
both the small and large banks, rather than a
decline in their importance in terms of assets.
Bank employment at any particular time, how-
ever, does appear to track closely with asset size.
Thus, the use of bank employment losses due to
bank deaths appears to be a reasonable proxy of
credit disruptions. In addition, the definitions of
small, midsized, and large firms used here cor-
respond with standard definitions of small, mid-
sized, and large banks.
Dependent Variable
and Specification
County-level employment data from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics aggregated to the SMSA level
are used to measure local economic activity.
Bank employment, as reported in the USELM
data, is subtracted from the aggregate employ-
ment. An alternative proxy for output (personal
income) yielded qualitatively similar results to
those reported here, but in order to compare
total employment rates with the employment
rates in firms of various size classes, it is not
used. Thus, specifications are also estimated
with employment in small, midsized, and large
firms (nonbank) as dependent variables. These
average employment rates (employment
divided by population) are reported in table 5.
Total employment rose over the period, which
began in recession, from 38.5 percent in 1980 to
41.1 percent in 1986. Employment in small and
midsized firms was essentially flat. Employment
in large firms headquartered within the state
changed little over the period, as did employ-
ment in out-of-state firms.
The effects of bank deaths on local eco-





























































NOTE: Numbers are expressed as SMSA means. Standard deviations are in
parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations based on USELM data.
analysis. The dependent variable is the employ-
ment rate at the end of the period. (Using
employment levels and including population as
an independent variable yielded similar results,
as did using changes in employment and
changes in employment rates.)
The following measures potentially affecting
employment growth are included as independ-
ent variables:
1) IWAGE = average (log) wage of
production workers in the SMSA as measured
by the Census of Manufacturers.
2) TAX = effective corporate tax rate for
the state.
3) DUM86 = a dummy variable equaling
1 for the 1984-86 period.
4) BIRTH 1-4 = percent change in banking
employment due to the births of banks of types
1 through 4.
5) EXPAND 1-4 = percent change in bank-
ing employment due to the expansion of banks
of types 1 through 4.
6) CONTRACT 1-4 = percent change in
banking employment due to the contraction of
banks of types 1 through 4.
7) DEATH 1-4 = percent change in bank-
ing employment due to the deaths of banks of
types 1 through 4.
8) lagged employment rates.
The means and standard deviations for these
variables are given in table 6. Financial restruc-
turing is measured by the percent change in
bank employment due to births, expansions,
contractions, and deaths (BIRTHi, EXPANDi,
CONTRACTi, and DEATHi; i = 1, ...4 ) for banks
of types 1 through 4. Note that the credit-disrup-
tion hypothesis cannot explain why an expan-
sion or birth of a bank would have an effect on
nonbank employment. All components of
change in banking are included for complete-
ness, however. In particular, the expansion and
contraction variables appear separately in case
the multiplier effect of changes in bank employ-
ment on local economies is not symmetric. Dif-
ferences in the estimated coefficients of CON-
TRACT'and DEATH variables are meant to
measure the impact of credit disruptions. On
average, 2.0, 1.1, 4.0, and 0.1 percent of SMSA
bank employment is lost over a two-year
period, due to deaths of bank types 1 through
4, respectively.
As suggested in the literature on firm loca-
tion, wages and tax rates are included to control
for their impact on economic growth. A dummy
variable for the 1984-86 period controls for any
fixed effect associated with this period of
economic expansion.
Following previous empirical studies, the
specification includes lagged values of the
dependent variables as independent variables to
control for the possibility of a spurious rela-
tionship between bank deaths and employment.
Suppose the causality between bank deaths and
employment actually runs from employment to
bank deaths. Banks tend to close after periods of
relatively slow regional economic growth. If the
lagged values of the dependent variables were
not included as independent variables, the coeffi-
cients on the bank death variables would tend to
be negative and significant even if bank deaths
had no true effect on employment. The regres-
sion results thus indicate whether lagged bank
deaths explain employment after accounting for
employment in the past year.
Timing problems in the data make it impos-
sible to entirely discount a spurious correlation.
http://clevelandfed.org/research/review/
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ment data for the SMSA—an average rate for the
ending year—and 2) employment rates for
various-sized finns reported in the USELM data,
based on end-of-calendar-year employment.
The bank death data are employment changes
due to deaths that occur in the two-year period
from December of the beginning year to
December of the ending year. The lagged
dependent variables are employment rates at
the beginning and middle of the two-year
period. Bank deaths at the end of the two-year
period (part of our independent variable) are
thus potentially caused by adverse economic
conditions at the end of the period (our depend-
ent variable).
To explore the simultaneity problem further,
however, we examine the effect of bank deaths
on economic activity in the year following the
two-year period. We also examine the impact of
economic conditions at the beginning of the
period on bank deaths. Finally, we test whether
our results are driven by adverse shocks occur-
ring in the oil states. The results, while not con-
clusive, suggest that our measure of the impact
of banks deaths on regional activity is not being
driven by simultaneous-equation bias.
IV. Estimation
Results
The model was estimated on the pooled sample
of 434 observations using ordinary least
squares, which are presented in table 7.
Model 1 (in column 1), which uses the total
employment rate as the dependent variable,
suggests that high wages have a negative
impact on total employment, while taxes have
no significant effect. Lagged employment rates
have a significant effect, as does the 1984-86
dummy variable.
The expansion and births of large in-state
banks {EXPAND 3 and BIRTH5) have a small
but statistically significant effect on nonbank
employment. The coefficient on EXPAND 3 is
0.012 and is significantly different from zero at
the 95 percent confidence level, which indicates
that a 10 percent increase in bank employment
from the expansion of large banks raises the
nonbank employment rate by 0.12 percentage
point. A 10 percent increase from the birth of
large banks raises the employment rate by 0.07
percentage point.
The contraction of bank employment
(CONTRACT! through CONTRACT A) does not
have a statistically significant effect on nonbank
employment for any of the bank types. The
death of midsized banks (DEATH2), however,
has a statistically significant negative effect on
the nonbank employment rate. The estimated
coefficient is -0.053 with a standard error of
0.020, suggesting that a 10 percent decrease in
bank employment from the death of midsized
banks reduces the nonbank employment rate
by 0.53 percentage point. Given that the aver-
age employment rate in the sample is 39.8 per-
cent, this represents a drop in nonbank employ-
ment of 1.3 percent. The estimated coefficient
for midsized bank contraction (CONTRACT!) is
-0.004 and is statistically not significantly dif-
ferent from zero. The difference between the
estimated coefficients of DEATH2 and CON-
TRACT! suggests that the effect of midsized
bank deaths on employment is almost entirely
due to credit disruptions as opposed to the mul-
tiplier effect of lost bank jobs. An F-test rejects
the hypothesis that the coefficients are identical
at the 90 percent confidence level.
The coefficients for DEATH 3 and DEATH4
are negative, and the coefficient for DEATH 1 is
positive, but all are statistically insignificant.
These insignificant effects for deaths of types 1,
2, and 3 banks could result from the relative
importance of midsized banks to local econo-
mies, from a difference in the type of deaths
they represent (for example, small-bank deaths
being takeovers rather than true failures), or
from the relative accuracy of the midsized bank
data previously discussed. Results should thus
be taken as positive evidence for the impor-
tance of midsized banks, rather than as
evidence for the lack of importance of small
and large banks.
To investigate further the local economic
impact of bank deaths, the model was reesti-
mated with the small-, midsized-, and large-firm
employment rates as dependent variables in
models 2, 3, and 4, respectively (shown in
columns 2, 3, and 4 of table 7). In model 2, the
expansion of midsized banks has a positive
effect on small-business employment, while the
contraction of small banks has a negative effect.
Bank deaths do not have a significant effect on
small businesses, which is contrary to the com-
mon view that small firms are the first to suffer
the effects of a credit cainch. It is possible, how-
ever, that these firms, many of which are rela-
tively new or small "mom-and-pop" operations,
rely more on informal sources of capital—such
as loans from friends and relatives, retained
earnings, and personal savings—than on funds
from commercial banks. This would make small
firms less likely to be affected by bank deaths. It
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is also possible that these results are driven by
the errors in the data for small firms discussed
above.
The impact of financial restructuring on mid-
sized firms is measured in model 3. Midsized
firms are more likely to rely on local commer-
cial banks than on national credit markets (such
as with large firms) or on informal sources of
capital (such as with small firms); see Ellie-
hausen and Woken (1990). They are thus more
likely to be affected by stress in the financial sec-
tor. The results support this conclusion. The
estimated coefficient for DEATH2 is -0.017 with
a t-statistic of 3.40, indicating that a 10 percent
decrease in bank employment from bank
deaths reduces the employment rate of mid-
sized firms by 0.17 percentage point. With an
average employment rate of 5.3 percent, this
represents a 3-2 percent drop in midsized firms'
employment. Again, an F-test rejects at the 90
percent confidence level the hypothesis that the



































































































































a. Significant at the 95 percent confidence level.
b. Significant at the 90 percent confidence level.
NOTE: Numbers are expressed as estimated coefficients. Standard errors are in parentheses.
SOURCE: Author's calculations.
The impact of midsized bank deaths on mid-
sized firms is small but statistically significant.
This result is plausible because these firms are
most likely to rely on local banks and because
midsized commercial banks are more likely to
concentrate on lending to such firms. This find-
ing controls for lagged total employment rates
and for the lagged midsized-firm employment
rate. A spurious correlation is still possible, how-
ever, if these lagged measures are inadequate
controls due to timing problems in the data.
Model 4 measures the impact of financial
restructuring on large firms. These firms are more
likely to have access to national credit markets
and thus may be less affected by local restructur-
ing. The results suggest that the expansion or
birth of large banks has a positive impact on
large-firm employment, while the contraction of
midsized banks has a negative impact. These
findings are significant at the 90 percent confi-
dence level, but not at the 95 percent level,
implying that changes in local bank structure do
not have powerful effects on large firms.
To explore the robustness of the results and
the potential for simultaneous-equations bias,
other specifications of the model were also
tested. First, the employment rate in the year fol-
lowing the two-year period used in the USELM
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lagged employment rates for the beginning,
middle, and end of the period included as
independent variables. The estimated coeffi-
cient on DEATH2 was -0.013 (compared with
an estimated coefficent of -0.053 in model 1)
with a t-statistic of 1.024. This smaller (and statis-
tically insignificant) effect suggests that either
the effect of bank deaths dampens out quickly
over time, or that the original result was driven
by simultaneity bias. This specification, how-
ever, allows bank deaths to have an effect up to
three years after they occur. Such long-term
influences of credit disruptions are unlikely if
banking markets are competitive.
Second, the impact of local economic condi-
tions on bank deaths was explored by using
midsized bank deaths as a dependent variable
and the beginning-of-period economic condi-
tions as an independent variable. The economic
conditions (total employment rates and employ-
ment rate of midsized firms) had no explanatory
effect on DEATH"1. (T-statistics of the economic
variables in various specifications were never
larger than 0.50.) This suggests that bank deaths
were not statistically driven by our measures of
local economic conditions.
Finally, robustness of the results was tested
by including geographic dummy variables to
control for effects from economic distress in oil-
producing states, which had an especially large
number of bank failures. In particular, we tested
whether the findings were solely due to bank
failures in Oklahoma, Louisiana, and Texas
between 1984 and 1986. Controlling for these
states did not affect the results. The coefficient
on DEATH! in model 1 remained above -0.040
in the various specifications tested, and the
t-statistic did not fall below 2.60.
In sum, the structure of the data in this
experiment does not permit standard tests of
Granger causality or simultaneity bias. The alter-
native specifications tested, however, suggest
that the results are not being driven by the
occurrence of bank deaths in economically dis-
tressed states or by any obvious feedback of
economic conditions on bank deaths.
V. Conclusion
Restructuring of the financial sector in the form
of bank mergers, failures, or takeovers poten-
tially affects investment and consumption deci-
sions by disaipting the links between borrowers
and creditors. Empirical evidence at both the
macro and regional levels has shown that finan-
cial structure and stress can have real economic-
effects.
This paper further explores the impact of
financial restructuring on local economies using
a data set that measures change in the local
banking sector by the birth, expansion, contrac-
tion, and deaths of banks at the metropolitan
level.
The empirical analysis suggests that, control-
ling for overall financial restructuring and
lagged economic activity, the deaths of mid-
sized banks—employing between 100 and 500
employees—have a negative but short-lived
impact on local economic activity. Furthermore,
employment in other midsized firms appears to
be most directly affected by these deaths. These
firms presumably rely on local banking markets
and are the most likely customers of midsized
banks. The results are robust across several
specifications.
The strongest effects of bank deaths are
found for midsized banks and firms, but this
should not be interpreted to mean that the
deaths of small and large banks have no effect.
Measurement problems, which exist for all size
categories, are least severe for midsized banks
and firms, which can account for the statistical
significance of these results and the statistical
insignificance of the results for the other two
types. Nonetheless, the results suggest that mid-
sized banks are an important source of funds
for midsized finns and that a disruption of this
link through financial restructuring can have
negative short-ain local economic effects.
The effects of credit disruption appear to be
short run. In particular, the impact of bank
deaths on employment rates appears to die out
after two years. One would expect such a result
if banking markets were competitive and con-
testable. In such markets, firms that found their
source of credit disrupted by a bank death
would quickly be able to establish credit rela-
tions with another institution. Thus, the results
presented here, while consistent with the credit-
view theory that disaiption in financial markets
can have real effects, also suggest that these
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